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Abstract
One of the most important Factors for eco-
nomic growth in each society is protecting prop-
erty rights which can present Freedom, Safety and 
Justice that can lead to economic growth. For this 
purpose I tried to not only define the property rights 
but also accumulation of physical and human capi-
tal and also on economic growth. This study uses 
Dincer’s (2007) model who suggests neoclassical 
growth model proposed by Mankiu et al. (1992) to 
analyze the effects of the property rights protection 
on the levels of economic performance. This study 
consists of 19 developing countries. The collected 
data covers the period from 2000-2010. It also pre-
dicts that protecting property rights has a positive 
effect on the accumulation of physical and human 
capital and economic growth.
Keywords: Property Rights, Human Capital, 
Physical Capital, Economic Growth
Introduction
The World Bank emphasizes on the impor-
tance, of the protection of property rights and its 
guarantee, for the economic development of the 
underprivileged countries in the globe1. The original 
theme of the book by Olson also relates to the fact 
that, economy in the novel world, is assured under 
the two following conditions: 
1 Institute for Trade Studies and Research, (1999), Pg. (10), 
Samadi, Ali Hassan, (2010), “ The Concept of Economic Prop-
erty Rights: An institutionalism approach”, Section of Rights, 
Law and Political Science College, subject articles, 101, Pg. 184 
1. Individuals must have a vast aggregate of 
warrantee rights, (in particular, property rights and 
agreements)
2. Owners should not be under predation or be 
inflicted by the private sector or government.
The mechanism under consideration in this re-
search is the effects of the protection of property rights, 
in relevance to the physical and human investments or 
capital accumulated, followed by the economic per-
formance, which is measured by the level of the gross 
domestic product (GDP). In this study, the rule of law 
index prevails and one of the aspects that this article 
wishes to put forth, is the rank attained for this index, 
as a proxy for the protection of property rights. 
Dincer(2007), by incrementing to the variables 
in supporting the property rights, according to the 
model of Mankiw, Romer and Vale (1992), ushered a 
new analyses level and illustrated that, alike the former 
studies, the accumulation of physical and human capi-
tal and as a result, the per capita GDP between coun-
tries, with degrees of protection of property rights, as 
well as saving rates, there is a positive connection2. 
As Keefer and Knack (1997) argues inadequate 
institutions degrade the protection of property rights 
which can be broadly defined as the rights of firm to 
assets and to the revenue streams generated by as-
sets. Poor protection of property rights threatens the 
firms with the loss of assets. According to Clague 
et al (1997), the risk of such loss is greater than more 
firms in an economy specialize. On the other hand, 
it is precisely the specialization that determines the 
economic performance of an economy.
2Dincer, O.C, (2007), The effects of property rights on eco-
nomic performance, Applied Economics, Vol. (39), No. 7, pp. 
825-839
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As Hall and Jones (1997) argue, the levels of 
economic performance vary considerably across 
countries and the differences are typically persis-
tent over time. Analyses based on an aggregate pro-
duction function, such as the one by Mankiw et al. 
(1992) (henceforth MRW), following the classic ar-
ticle of Solow (1956) provide some important insight 
into these differences. The main source of variation 
is identified as differences in capital accumulation, 
both physical and human. Nevertheless, levels ac-
counting exercises, such as Hall and Jones (1999), 
show that the differences in physical and human 
capital accumulation explain only a small fraction of 
the differences in the levels of economic performance 
across countries, leading the economists to propose 
institutions as possible explanatory variables.
Related Literature
Though, in the decade of the ‘70’s, a specific at-
tention was focused on the institutions and the new 
economy of “institutionalism” was also founded. But 
the infiltration of varied institutions on a communal 
basis, property rights and its relative problems can be 
specifically seen to have attained augmentation pat-
terns from 1990 onwards. Hence, beyond this period, 
varied methods for patterning and resolving econom-
ic growth patterns, as always, explain the differences 
of the institutional representatives. Such that four 
patterns can be indicated to, these are:
1. Views on the acts or actions
2. Integration patterns of generations
3. Other mathematical methods
4. Coded Patterns
In the studies of Teng (2000) and Sylwester (2001), 
these studies are close to the framework of views on acts 
or actions. Teng has construed an act in two phases with 
two players, the “sovereignty of the Government” and 
a large number of “economic agents or mediators”. 
Sylwester has also constructed an act in two phases, in 
which, it is surmised that a part of the production is ne-
gated from the entrepreneurs towards property. 
Studies of Svensson (1998), Gradstein (2004) in-
cluding Dincer and Ellis (2005), were some studies, 
where the pattern of framework of growth patterns of 
integrating generations did not affect the complete pro-
tection of property rights, as to the augmentation and 
accumulation of capital which has been analyzed; e.g. 
Svensson (1998) rendered a political pattern, from an 
institutional modification pattern and pursued to deter-
mine the amount of optimum cost selected for the level 
of efficiency in the legal system, or (the equilibrium of 
capital in the legal infrastructures). Svensson’s pattern is 
an integrating pattern of generations, consisting of two 
sections, being the private and government sectors. In 
general, it discusses the concept that institutional re-
forms are influenced by political considerations. In this 
study, according to the interests of the mediating rep-
resentatives, the discounted aggregate, is the per capita 
consumption in the private and government sectors. 
The consumer also represents a maximum beneficial 
welfare with a restricted consumption in the first and 
second sequences. It may be assumed that, in the first 
series, there is an absence of production; and likewise, 
consumption in the second series, is formed by incomes 
arising from domestic and foreign capital. But in rel-
evance to the incomes that usher from domestic invest-
ments, the efficiency criteria for the legal system (λ) 
have been denoted as (1-λ). The total results obtained 
in resolving his pattern has illustrated that, governments 
of polarized and instable societies have slighter inclina-
tions in capitals or investments in legal infrastructures. 
This matter causes a weak implementation in property 
rights and thereby, there shall be a reduction in the do-
mestic level of investments3. 
In the coded patterns, efforts have been made to 
designate the shortcomings of property rights in eco-
nomic growth patterns and formulate them. An im-
mense part of such studies are spent on the imperfect 
protection of property rights, such as, a decrease in 
capital or investments due to predation and political 
bribery. The aspect of predation is so discussed that, 
because of the absence of a protection of property 
rights, a set of economic factors can get involved in 
the predation of a percentage of the production of 
others without any effort. This matter reduces the in-
centives for investments and production. 
Studies pertaining to Gonzalez (2007), Mino 
(2006), Tornell and Valesco (1992), Grossman and 
Kim (1996), Tornell and Lane (1999), Lindner and 
Stulik (2004), Van Long and Surger (2006), are some 
of the studies, in which, the imperfect property rights 
have been analyzed as a common pool. In other words, 
due to the fact that, the results of the investments of 
individuals are in predation by others, individuals give 
up hope where investments are concerned and hence, 
property rights are not protected, thus, bringing about 
a reduction in economic growth. The entire of these 
studies have been performed within the framework of 
coded patterns. In economic patterns that are relevant 
to predation, the productive and appropriative facets 
(negated property) are assimilated and analyzed. In 
3 Svensson, J. (1998). Investment, property right and po-
litical instability; theory and evidence. European Economic Re-
view, Vol. (42), 1317-1341 and p. 13250
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the current text, Grossman and Kim have theorized 
predation within the sphere of economic growth. This 
exclusive research derives the correlation between two 
groups of individuals, namely, those who engage in 
the act of predation and individuals who are inflicted 
by the potentials of predation have been put under 
analyses. Such that, it is presumed that these individu-
als are orders of generations of a family, clan or even 
a nation. Every generation from each ‘dynasty’ makes 
decisions, similar to known growth patterns, to allo-
cate its subsisting wealth between consumption and 
investment productivity. Though, in contrary, to the 
theoretical patterns, where it is assumed that individu-
als, in addition, to deploying their subsisting wealth, 
to being allocated between consumption and invest-
ment productivity, also allot it between offensive and 
defensive activities. By resolving the constructed vi-
sual patterns, the result that comes to hand is that, the 
rate of accumulated capital and that, the protection of 
property rights, is only for the generations of dynasties 
under the infliction of predation, with which it has a 
direct connection. The other and in the general attain-
ments from this study, is the fact that, in contrary to the 
conventional wisdom, a better protection of property 
rights can lead to a slower accumulation of capital4. 
In a number of studies, such as some of those 
in relevance to Palda (1999), Grossman and Kim 
(1995), Anderson and Bandiera (2005), methods, 
other than the alleviation of coded patterns, inte-
grated patterns of generations and views on the acts 
or actions have been utilized. Palda has constructed 
a pattern, in which, the individual is selected for be-
ing productive or is in the pursuance of performing 
bribery actions. In this pattern some of the individu-
als produce wealth, whereas, some others utilize the 
wealth of others and indulge in their predation. More-
over, property right conditions are measured with pa-
rameters that are a part of the incomes present, which 
have capacities of being extorted, by those assimila-
tions sought bribery actions, Palda5. Palda relates the 
optimum level of property rights to a number of those 
who sought bribery actions and concludes that, in the 
empirical tests, of the unequal impacts of income, as 
to the growth of economy, the correlation between 
property rights and the redistribution of income must 
be taken into view. This study was carried out within 
the framework of other mathematical methods. 
4Grossman H.I. and M. Kim (1996). Predation and Accu-
mulation. Journal of Economic Growth, Vol. (1), pp. 333-350 
and P. 3460
5Palda. F, (1999), Property Rights vs. Redistribution; 
Which path to national wealth? Public Choice” Vol. (101), pp. 
129-145 and P. 1400 
In the present study, a survey of the effects of the 
protection of property rights, as to the accumulation of 
physical and human capital and its impacts on the eco-
nomic performance is followed. The economic perfor-
mance utilized here is the domestic gross production. 
Materials and Methods
The Model
One of the most influential models analyzing the 
differences in the levels of economic performance 
across countries in the economic growth literature is 
the neoclassical growth model of MRW. MRW find 
that the accumulation of physical and human capi-
tal is the main factor explaining the differences in the 
levels of economic performance across countries. 
Nevertheless, they do not provide any explanation 
about the sources of the differences in the accumu-
lation of physical and human capital other than the 
saving rates. In other words, they simply suggest that, 
holding the labor growth constant, countries with 
higher saving rates have higher levels of capital stock, 
both physical and human, per unit of labor and hence 
higher levels of output per unit of labor. On the other 
hand, as mentioned earlier, institutions that protect 
property rights are crucial for the accumulation of 
physical and human capital. Therefore, without the 
institution their model is incomplete.
For a better understanding of the cross country 
differences in the levels of economic performance, 
a model beyond the neoclassical growth model of 
MRW is needed. Augmenting their model by intro-
ducing the property rights protection provides some 
important additional insight.
Following the neoclassical growth model of 
MRW in the augmented model, there is assumed to 
be only one commodity, output as a whole, y (1), 
which can be consumed. C (t) or invested to create 
new unit of physical capital, K(t) and human capital 
H(t). A constant fraction, sk, of output is saved and 
invested in physical capital and a constant fraction, 
sk, of output is saved and invested in human capi-
tal. Both physical and human capital are assumed to 
depreciate at a constant rate s. On the other hand, 
the accumulation of net capital stock, physical and 
human, does not only depend on sk and sh and s, 
but also on the degree of property rights protection, 
p, which is assumed to be exogenously determined. 
Assuming that the effect of the degree of property 
rights protection on physical capital differs from the 
effect on human capital accumulation, the net, the 
effect of property rights on economic performance
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Increase in the stock of physical capital and the 
net; Increase in the stock of human capital at a point 
in time are given by
( ) ( ) ( )pkkK t pks Y t K tδ= −
( ) ( ) ( )phhH t phs Y t H tδ= −
0 , 1,1 ln 0pk h pk sk≤ ≤ +                          (1)
Where 
, , 0 , 1pk p ph p andσ φ σ φ= =  
Property rights are fully protected, as MRW 
implicitly assumes p is equal to 1. If. on the other 
hand, the property rights are not fully protect I. e. 
if p is smaller than 1, part of output supposed to be 
invested in physical and human capital is used for 
protection purposes, retarding the net increase in 
the stock of physical capital and of human capital
As in the neoclassical growth model of MRW, 
protection at a point in time is given by the protec-
tion function which takes the from
[ ]1( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )Y t k t H t A t L t α βα β − −=
0, 0, 1α β α β+                                        (2)
Where L(t) stands for labour and A(t) stands for 
knowledge or effectiveness of labor. Since the protec-
tion function exhibits constant returns to scale in the 
three arguments, physical capital, human capital and 
effective labour, it can be written in intensive form as:
( ) ( ) ( ) ,y t k t h tα β= where y = Y | AL 
Stands for output per effective unit of labour, 
k = k | AL stands for physical capital per effective 
unit of labour and h=H | AL stands for human capi-
tal per effective unit of labour.
Labour and knowledge are assumed to grow ex-
ogenously at rates n and g, respectively:
( ) ( )L t nL t= and ( ) ( )A t g A t=                        (3)
Given that evolution of labour and knowledge 
is assumed to be exogenous, the behaviour of the 
economy is characterized by the evolution of capi-
tal, both physical and human:
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )pkkk t pks K t h t n g k t
α β δ= − + +
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )p hhH t phs K t h t n g h t
α β δ= − + +
 
(4)
Since there are decreasing returns to both physi-
cal and human capital. Therefore both physical cap-
ital per effective unit of labour and human capital 
per effective unit of labour converge to respective 
steady state levels k* and h* given by
1/(1 )(1 ) (1 )
*
pk ph
k h k hp p s sk
n g
α ββ β β β
δ
− −
− − 
=  
+ + 
1/(1 )(1 ) (1 )
*
pk ph
k h k hp p s sh
n g
α βα α α α
δ
− −
− − 
=  
+ +               (5)
The augmented model attempts to answer the 
questions regarding the effects of degree of property 
rights protection as well as the effects of the saving 
rates on output. Substituting the steady state levels 
of physical and human capital per effective unit of 
labour k* and h*, given in Equation 2 and taking 
logs give the steady state level of output per unit of 
labour:
*
( )
1 1 1 1 1
YIn y Lnpk Lnpk pk Lnsk ph Lnsh Ln n g
L
α β α β α β δ
α β α β α β α β α β
+ 
= + + + + − + + 
− − − − − − − − − −   
(6)
As far as the effects of labour growth on output are 
concerned. There is a negative relationship between 
the steady state level of output per labour and the la-
bour growth. The elasticity of output per unit of labour 
with respect to (n+g+s) is equal to ( ) / (1 )α β α β− − −
The augmented model also suggests that the 
accumulation of physical and human capital is the 
main factor explaining the differences in the levels 
of economic performance across countries.
Nevertheless, in the augmented model, the ac-
cumulation of capital, both physical and human, is 
determined by the degree of property rights protec-
tion as well as the saving rates. In other words, the 
augmented model demonstrates that holding the la-
bour growth constant, countries with higher saving 
rates do not necessarily have higher levels of capital 
stock per unit of labour and hence do not necessarily 
have higher levels of output per unit of labour.
The degree of property rights protection is as impor-
tant as the saving rates. Perhaps even more important.
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Empirical Analysis
MRW suggest the following specification to in-
vest – gate the predictions regarding the determi-
nants of output:
Where gdp denotes the steady state level of output 
per unit of labour and physicalk and humank denote 
the saving rates devoted to physical and human capital, 
sk and sh respectively. Finally population denotes the 
sum of the growth rate of labour, of knowledge and the 
depreciation rate (n+g+s). The coefficients of interest 
are the ones which determine the elasticity of output 
with respect to the saving rates physicalk and humank.
0 1 2 3Lngdp Lnphysicalk Lnhumank Lnpopulation uλ λ λ λ= + + + +                                                      (7)
Augmenting the neoclassical growth model of 
MRW by introducing the degree of property rights 
protection leads to a number of significant changes 
in the empirical specification given above:
0 1 2 2 3protect Lngdp Ln protect In protect protect Ln humank protect Inε ε ε ε ε= + + + +
 
4 5 6physicalk Ln humank protect In humank In populationε ε ε ε+ + + +                                             (8)
Where and protect  denote pk and ph respec-
tively in this specification the degree of property 
rights protection protect does not only affect output, 
but also affects the elasticity of output with respect 
to saving rates. Hence, the coefficients of the terms 
interacting physicalk and human with and protect  
deserve particular attention.
Data
The data extracted during a period of time, i.e. 
from the year 2000 to the year 2010, is from the World 
Bank6 and the International Country Risk Guide 
(ICRG). The average share of private investments, 
net incomes and net current transfers in gross national 
income (GNI) to measure the amount of saving rate 
allotted to physical capital (physicalk); and the average 
share of the total number registered of those enrolled 
in the secondary school, relating to a population of 
an age group which officially can enter the secondary 
school as a proxy, for the rate which has been allocated 
to the human capital (humank), was thus utilized. 
As a proxy for the extent of (property rights pro-
tection) protect, the rule of law index is used. This 
index has been constructed by Stephen Knack and 
the IRIS Center of University of Maryland from 
the ICRG data. The rule of law index (in figures) is 
from (0) to (6) and reflects the degree that citizens 
of a country are receptive to the acceptance of the 
established institutions, in order to formulate and 
execute laws and arbitrate disputes and complaints. 
Knack and Keefer proclaim that, higher levels 
demonstrate political institutions that are sound, 
with a fortified and firm judiciary system, including 
regularized regulation criterions for the succession 
of power. The lower levels illustrate the presence of 
6World Bank Development Indicators (WDI)
tradition in the society, which depends on a kind of 
physical force or resorts to illegality to settle and re-
solve disputes. 
As formerly mentioned, the rule of law index 
has variable proxies for varied property protection 
rights, which has figures ranging from (0) to (6). If 
this index amount is between (0) and (1), it dem-
onstrates a low degree in relevance to the property 
rights protection, whereas, if it is between (2) and 
(4) this shows a mediocre level in this regard and if 
the index figures stand in the range of (4) and (6), 
this entails a high level of protection of property 
rights. In this study, ranks pertaining to this index 
have been used. 
Samples under survey
Data for the variables and similarly, the rule of 
law index is available for approximately 100 coun-
tries. Samples under survey in this thesis are 36 
countries, comprising of 19 developing countries 
and 17 developed countries. These countries have 
been listed in this thesis in Tables (1 to 5) and can be 
segregated according to the rule of law index. 
Specification of Model
The neoclassical growth models proposed by 
Mankiw, Romer and Vale, for predicting effective 
factors for production and growth, are as hereunder:
In GDP = β. + β
1
 in physicalk + β
2
 in humank+ β
3
 
in population + u
In which, GDP denotes the stability level of ef-
fective manpower production, whereas, physicalk 
and humank, illustrate the saving rates devoted to 
the physical and human capital that are according 
to the respective equations of skand sh. Population 
signifies the total growth rate of manpower and the 
rate of depreciation that is (n + g + δ).
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The neoclassic growth model is not extensive 
in relation to the high and critical changes fol-
¨ ¨
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7ln ln ln ln ln ln ln lngdp  protect protect physicalk protect physicalk humank protect humank poulation ε= + + + + + + + +
� �
       
lowed, that are displayed in it in the following 
form.
¨ ¨
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7ln ln ln ln ln ln ln lngdp  protect protect physicalk protect physicalk humank protect humank poulation ε= + + + + + + + +
� �
       
In which protect and protect are in the order of Pk 
and Ph and in this relation, the degree of property pro-
tection rights does not leave an impact on the produc-
tion only, but also has an effect on the elasticity’s of 
production in relative to the saving rates. On one hand, 
the coefficient amendments that illustrate the interac-
tion of physicalk and protect and that of humank and 
protect are of special importance7. The importance of 
this interaction is due to mechanisms for effects in the 
degree of the property rights protection, as to the eco-
nomic growth that is taken into consideration. 
The degree of property rights protection is mea-
sured from two courses, these being the direct effects 
and effects on the accumulation of physical and hu-
man capital, including the economic performance, 
which is measured by the level of GDP capital and al-
leviates it. On the other hand, the interaction of the 
degree of property rights protection and saving rates 
show the second course of effects of the levels of prop-
erty rights protection, in relation to the economic per-
formance, which is also supplemented in the model. 
Specification of Model 
The model utilized in this study is according to the 
founding of views in the connection between the prop-
erty rights and economic growth, with the help of Dinc-
er’s Model (2007), which has been rendered as follows:
log GDP = f (log s, log z, log W, W log s, W log z)
GDP: Gross Domestic Produce (economic 
growth)
S: Is the average share of the aggregate of the 
secondary school enrollment to the population of 
the age group that officially relates to the secondary 
school as a proxy for the saving rates allotted to hu-
man capital humank, have been utilized.
Z: Net income and net current transfers in ac-
tual gross incomes per capita for measuring the 
amount of savings devoted to the physical capital i.e. 
physicalk variables, have been utilized.
(Capital formation + Current Transfer + Net 
Income) / (GNP) 
7Dincer,O. (2007), The Effects of Property Rights on Eco-
nomic Performance. Journal of Applied Economics, 39 (7): 
825-837
W: As a proxy for the degrees or levels of property 
protection rights, the rule of law index has been used. 
In this research the rank of countries has been utilized.
Data
The data extracted during a period of time, i.e. 
from the year 2000 to the year 2010, is from the 
World Bank8 and the International Country Risk 
Guide (ICRG). The average share of private invest-
ments, net incomes and net current transfers in gross 
national income (GNI) to measure the amount of 
saving rate allotted to physical capital (physicalk) 
has been utilized and the average share of the ag-
gregate of the secondary school enrollment to the 
population of the age group that officially relates to 
the secondary school as a proxy for the saving rates 
allotted to human capital humank, has been utilized. 
Manpower, L has been taken into consideration for 
the population. 
As a proxy for the degrees or levels of property 
protection rights, the rule of law index has been used. 
This index has been constructed by Stephen Knack 
and the IRIS Center of University of Maryland from 
the ICRG data. The rule of law index (in figures) is 
from (0) to (6) and reflects the degree that citizens of 
a country are receptive to the acceptance of the estab-
lished institutions, in order to formulate and execute 
laws and arbitrate disputes and complaints. 
Knack and Keefer proclaim that, higher levels 
demonstrate political institutions that are sound, with 
a fortified and firm judiciary system, including regular-
ized regulation criterions for the succession of power. 
The lowprotect illustrate the presence of tradition in the 
society, which depends on a kind of physical force or 
resorts to illegality to settle and resolve disputes. 
As formerly mentioned, the rule of law index 
has variable proxies for varied property protection 
rights, which has figures ranging from (0) to (6). If 
this index amount is between (0) and (1), it dem-
onstrates a low degree in relevance to the property 
rights protection, whereas, if it is between (2) and 
(4) this shows a medprotect in this regard and if the 
index figures stand in the range of (4) and (6), this 
entails a high level of protection of property rights. 
8World Bank Development Indicators (WDI)
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Samples under survey 
Data for the variables and similarly, the rule 
of law index is available for approximately 60 
countries. Samples under survey in this thesis 
are 19 countries, comprising of 19 developing 
countries. These countries referred to, have been 
listed in this thesis and are in Table (1). These 
can be also be segregated according to the rule 
of law index. 
Table 1: Samples under survey are 19 countries
Developing 
Countries
1. Albania.2. Argentina. 3. Brazil. 4. Columbia. 5. Dominicans.6. Guatemala. 7. Guinea.  
8. Indonesia. 9. Iran. 10. Malaysia. 11. Mexico. 12. Nicaragua.13. Peru. 14. Philippines. 
15. Romania. 16. Syria.17. Panama. 18. El Salvador.19. Kenya
As can be observed in Table (1), the countries 
have been segregated according to their status of de-
velopment. In Table (2), countries are listed accord-
ing to their degree of the rule of law index.
Results
Methods for the estimation of models for the de-
veloping groups of countries
In this thesis, in order to estimate the models 
designed to illustrate the relation between proper-
ty rights and economic growth, with due attention 
to Dincer’s Model (2007); and the integrated data 
paneled model in econometrics and the Eviews 7 
Software, for estimating and determining the rel-
evance between the varied models utilized. In this 
thesis, the TSLS9 Model has been used.
Model estimations and analyses of results of de-
veloping countries
The TSLS Model is utilized in order to estimate 
the models used. The results of the models are as 
given below:
As can be observed, all the variables that have 
been applied to in the models are within the reliabil-
ity level of being interpreted by 95 percent. The R2 
which has been attained in the said models is that, the 
independent variables of all the blocks under survey, 
explain 99 percent of the changes in the dependant 
GDP variables. In other words, they demonstrate that 
all the independent variables together, to the amount 
of 99 percent, illustrate the changes of the dependant 
variables. In addition, a low R2 does not signify a poor 
estimation of the model. On the other hand, all the 
independent variables that have been applied to as in 
the property rights, human and physical capital, the 
effects of property rights as to human capital, the ef-
fects of property rights relation to the physical capi-
tal, each of which has an interpretation, as to these 
impacts. Moreover, the effects of the degree of the 
rule of law index, which, in other words is a proxy 
for the protection of property rights and proves to be 
positive and significant in relation to human capital; 
and in the same manner is effective in the degree of 
the rule of law index as to the physical capital which 
is also positive in significance. 
Table 2. Countries classified according to institutional criterions
Countries of high institutional 
criteria
Countries of medium institutional 
criteria
Countries of low institutional 
criteria
Syria Albania Brazil
Romania Columbia
Iran Kenya
Philippines Guatemala
Peru El Salvador
Panama
Argentina
Dominicans
Guinea
Nicaragua
Mexico
Malaysia
Indonesia
9Two stage least square (and AR)
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Conclusion
As we have stated till now, the most important 
factor, which has an impact on the process of eco-
nomic growth, are the changes which occur in the 
qualitative institutional level of a country. In accor-
dance with the explanations rendered in Chapter 
(IV), the neoclassic growth model initiates that the 
most imperative and effective factor in economic 
growth is the variation between the accumulation 
of human and physical capital. In the neoclassic 
growth model, it is easily assumed that in all the 
countries, the aspect of property rights protection is 
absolutely safeguarded. But in this thesis, we have 
brushed aside this neoclassic theory; and by utilizing 
the Dincer’s Method (2007), the variables of prop-
erty right protection levels have been supplemented 
to the neoclassic model. The following results were 
obtained from this expanded model:
• In developing countries, the property rights 
protection has a positive and significant effect as to 
the economic growth. As also illustrated in the co-
efficients, the coefficients of property rights in de-
veloping countries are not so high, also due to the 
improper government-ship and qualitative institu-
tional characteristics of these countries 
• Human capital in developing countries has a 
positive effect also and is significant on their eco-
nomic growth. According to the derived coefficient, 
the human capital coefficient is not so good in de-
veloping countries, because of the fact that, educa-
tion is not given importance to and suitable invest-
ment is not performed on the human capital 
• The physical capital also has a positive effect 
in developing countries; and is noteworthy in rel-
evance to the economic growth. As stated for the 
other variables, the coefficient of physical capital in 
Table 3: Attainments of estimations for developing countries
Explanatory Variables Coefficients Statistics t Feasibility
c 5.805672 34.05452 0.0000
S 0.460681 10.31234 0.0000
Z 0.134142 3.721386 0.0003
W 0.067719 3.931717 0.0001
H
2
2.380536 2.380536 0.0009
K
2
0.007001 2.492363 0.0001
R2 0.997848
Durbin-Watson Stat 1.605268
F-Statistic 2419.612
the developing countries is not high. This is also be-
cause of the low and an irregular investments 
• The effects of property rights, in relevance to 
the human capital in developing countries, has al-
located a positive and major coefficient on the eco-
nomic growth
• As we have mentioned in introducing the vari-
ables, it can be stated that, the effect of the savings 
rate as to the GDP of a country, is related in a positive 
manner to the degree of property rights protection
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